University of South Florida - click to return to home page
Search the USF Web site Site Map USF home page

Links for Prospective StudentsLinks for Our StudentsLinks for VisitorsLinks for Faculty & StaffLinks for Alumni & ParentsLinks for Business & CommunityInformation About USF Campuses


 


ACADEMIC PROGRAMS

UNDERGRADUATE DEGREE PROGRAMS


Criminology - B.A.

English & American Literature - B.A.

History - B.A.

Interdisciplinary Social Science - B.A.

Professional and Technical Writing - B.A.

Psychology - B.A.

Social Work - B.S.W.


POST-BACCALAUREATE PROGRAM
Language, Speech & Hearing Post-Baccalaureate (online)

GRADUATE DEGREE
 PROGRAMS


Criminal Justice Administration - M.A.
    

Library Science - M.A.
     Summer 2008 Courses

Rehabilitation Counseling - M.A.

Social Work - M.S.W

 
 

My Research

 

Death Qualification

My major line of research examines the effects of death qualification on capital trials. During death qualification, venirepersons are questioned about their beliefs regarding the death penalty. In order to be eligible for capital jury service, a prospective juror must be able and willing to consider both legal penalties (i.e., death or life in prison without the possibility of parole) as appropriate forms of punishment. A person who meets the aforementioned Witt (1985) standard is deemed "death-qualified" and is eligible for capital jury service; a person who does not meet the aforementioned Witt (1985) standard is deemed "excludable" and is barred from capital jury service.

Death-qualification theory. My research has suggested that death-qualification status is actually a constellation of dispositional factors which may, in fact, be more typical of certain demographic subgroups than others (Butler, 2008d). The aforementioned dispositional factors tend to drive certain attitudinal indices which then, in turn, tend to drive certain behaviors (Butler, 2008d).

Demographic Differences. Death-qualified jurors are more likely to be male, Caucasian, moderately well-educated, politically conservative, Catholic or Protestant, and middle-class (Butler & Moran, 2002).

Dispositional Differences. Death-qualified jurors are more likely to have a high belief in a just world, espouse legal authoritarian beliefs, exhibit an internal locus of control, and have a low need for cognition (Butler & Moran, 2007a; 2007b).

Attitudinal Differences. Death-qualified jurors are more likely to be racist, sexist, and homophobic, weigh aggravating circumstances (i.e., arguments for death) more heavily than mitigating circumstances (i.e., arguments for life), evaluate ambiguous expert scientific testimony more favorably, and be skeptical of defenses involving mental illness (including the insanity defense). Death-qualified jurors are also more susceptible to the pretrial publicity that surrounds capital cases, more affected by the victim impact statements that occur during the sentencing phase of capital trials, more supportive of capital punishment as it relates to the elderly and the physically disabled, and more likely to evaluate mitigating circumstances more negatively when a combination of strong and weak mitigation is presented than when only strong mitigation is presented (Butler, 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2008d; 2008e; Butler & Moran, 2002; 2007b; 2008a; Butler & Wasserman, 2006). I just concluded a project in which I examined the role of death qualification in venirepersons' susceptibility to eyewitness testimony and explored whether or not eyewitness expert testimony moderated the effect that death-qualification status has on juror decision-making (Butler & Moran, 2008b). Check back to see what the data revealed!

Behavioral Differences. Death-qualified jurors are more likely to find capital defendants guilty and sentence them to death. I have found this pro-conviction, pro-death bias in death-qualified jurors' evaluations of both adult and juvenile defendants (Butler, 2007b; 2008e).

Process Effects. The mere process of death qualification profoundly affects jurors in capital trials. For example, Haney (1984a; 1984b) found that jurors exposed to death qualification were significantly more likely to find the defendant guilty, think that other jurors believed the defendant to be guilty, sentence the defendant to death, and assume that the law disapproves of opposition to the death penalty. Since capital voir dire (i.e., jury selection) is the only voir dire that requires the penalty to be discussed before it is relevant, the focus of jurors’ attention is drawn away from the presumption of innocence and onto post-conviction events. The time and energy spent by the court presents an implication of guilt and suggests to jurors that the penalty is relevant, if not inevitable. Death qualification also forces jurors to imagine themselves in the penalty phase. Research has shown that simply imagining that an event will happen makes it more likely that the event will actually occur. During death qualification, jurors are repeatedly questioned about their views on the death penalty. Consequently, jurors can become desensitized to the imposition of the death penalty due to repeated exposure to this extremely emotional issue and jurors are forced to publicly commit to a particular viewpoint, both of which increase the likelihood that jurors will vote for a death sentence. In addition, jurors who do not endorse the death penalty also encounter implied legal disapproval by being judged “unfit for service.” All of the research concerning the process effects of death qualification was conducted under the now-defunct Witherspoon (1968) standard. One day, I hope to replicate this earlier study under the current Witt (1985) standard (Butler & Moran, 2008c).

Defendant Attractiveness

I am beginning research project that will explore the impact of defendant attractiveness in capital cases. In the past, good-looking defendants have (generally) been treated more leniently by the legal system than not-so-good-looking defendants (i.e., a real-life example of the "what is beautiful is good theory"). However, for a variety of reasons, I tend to think that this "attractiveness-leniency bias" is no longer applicable to defendants charged with heinous offenses (Butler, 2008h). Am I right? Am I wrong? Stay tuned for the results!

Defense-Attorney Concessions

Sometimes defense attorneys in first-degree murder trials will argue that their client should be found guilty of a lesser-included charge, rather than argue that the defendant is completely devoid of responsibility. I recently explored the impact of such defense-attorney concessions on juror decisions. My research indicated that defense-attorney concessions actually increased the likelihood of conviction of a more serious offense (Butler, 2008f). In other words, defense-attorney concessions do not appear to be judicious trial strategy.

Execution of the Elderly and the Physically Disabled

As the constitutionality of capital punishment continues to be called into question, more states are imposing moratoria on executions. The result? A bottleneck on death rows across the nation. Most people don't know that death-row inmates are growing old and, at times, executed when they have become elderly and/or physically disabled. I recently conducted a study in order to explore community members' attitudes toward this issue and found that most people were not particularly supportive of executing elderly and/or physically-disabled death-row inmates. In summary, it appears that most people consider elderly and/or physically-disabled death-row inmates to be "vulnerable populations," deserving of special protection under the law (Butler, 2008e).

Insanity

At present, 37 states allow defendants to plead not guilty by reason of insanity (i.e., NGRI). While the percentage of defendants who plead NGRI is extremely small (and the rate of successful NGRI pleas is even smaller), the controversy surrounding the insanity defense is enormous. This debate is largely due to the myths about the legal standards of insanity, mental illness, and the insanity defense that are perpetrated by the popular media (e.g., CSI; Law and Order). A few years ago, I set out to examine how jurors' knowledge of and attitudes toward the aforementioned constructs influenced their decision-making processes.

My research found that jurors who exhibited high levels of support for the insanity defense were more likely to have more knowledge about the legal standards of insanity, more positive attitudes toward mental illness, and were less likely to endorse the myths associated with the insanity defense. In addition, jurors' level of support for the insanity defense, age, educational level, occupation, type of prior jury service, and political views were related to their willingness to find the defendant NGRI. Notably, three factors that have been found to impact juror decision-making processes in insanity cases in previous research failed to do so in the current study: participants’ experience with psychological disorders; participants’ exposure to psychotropic medications; and participants’ experience with psychologists or psychiatrists. The findings both replicate and extend earlier findings by suggesting that attitudes toward the insanity defense are more complex than previously imagined (Butler, 2006a).

Capital Trial Judges' Evaluations of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

In capital cases, the judge has the final say as to whether the defendant is sentenced to death or LWOP. In doing so, s/he weighs gives great consideration to the jury's sentence, but has the ultimate power to overturn a jury's decision (i.e., reduce a death sentence to LWOP and increase and LWOP sentence to death).

A great deal of research has been devoted to exploring how jurors weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but very little research has been geared toward empirically examining how judges weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances (Butler & Moran, 2002; Butler & Moran, 2007a). One of my next projects will involve surveying capital trial judges in the state of Florida with the same measure I used in two prior studies involving venirepersons (Butler, 2008i). My goal is to be able to draw comparisons between the way venirepersons and capital trial judges way the same aggravating, statutory, and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.

Mitigation

Since mitigating circumstances are not limited by statute, capital defense attorneys are encouraged to present as much mitigation as possible in order to save their clients' lives (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978). However, my most recent study revealed that all mitigation is not created equally and that jurors tend to average, as opposed to add, mitigation of varying strengths. The result is that the presentation of "weak" mitigation (e.g., evidence of addiction) may actually make a death sentence more likely. The findings suggest that capital defense attorneys are in a tremendous bind: If they don't present all of the mitigation available to them, they issue of "ineffective assistance of counsel" may be raised on appeal. If they do present all of the mitigation available to them, they may be hastening their clients' death sentences (Butler & Moran, 2008a).

Plea Bargaining in Capital Cases

Sometimes defense attorneys in capital cases will plead guilty, but ask the jury to sentence their client to life in prison without the possibility of parole (i.e., LWOP), as opposed to the death penalty (Butler, 2008g). Do such admissions enhance the credibility of the attorney and the defendant, therefore increasing the probability of a life sentence? In contrast, do so such admissions hurt the credibility of the attorney and the defendant, therefore increasing the probability of a death sentence? My study found the latter to be true: Conceding guilt actually makes jurors more likely to sentence a defendant to death (Butler, 2008g). Although findings of the current research are considered preliminary and additional research into this topic is certainly warranted, defense attorneys should be cautious when considering pleading guilty and, essentially, beginning their client's capital trial with the penalty phase (Butler, 2008g).

Post-Sentence Civil Commitment

Post-sentence civil commitment is a procedure that authorizes the state to indefinitely confine convicted sex offenders if it is determined that they are sexually violent predators. A “sexually violent predator” is “a person who has committed a sexually violent offense and suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.”

In order to determine if a convicted sex offender meets the criteria of a sexually violent predator, a multidisciplinary team is appointed to conduct a clinical evaluation. If they find that the defendant meets the criteria for a sexually violent predator, a recommendation for involuntary civil commitment is filed. A trial (either by judge or 6-person jury) is held within 30 days of the petition. If the judge or jury determines that the individual is a sexually violent predator, s/he will be indefinitely confined to a secure facility until it is determined that they are no longer dangerous to society.

My research has found that most jurors espouse negative attitudes toward sex offenders and, consequently, are both more likely to favor post-sentence civil commitment as the appropriate punishment for sexually violent predators and be receptive to evidence favoring commitment. Although jurors were less likely to recommend committing the defendant immediately after reading arguments favoring release, this effect was both slight and temporary. In fact, initial verdicts (rendered before any evidence is presented) and final verdicts (rendered after all evidence is presented) were virtually indistinguishable. This particular finding appears to have disturbing legal implications: Jurors who hear post-sentence civil commitment cases appear to be so biased against sex offenders that they have reached a decision before they hear the facts of a particular case (Butler, 2006b).